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This paper takes the perspective that violent transnational social 
movements (VTSMs) have profoundly impacted contemporary 
conflict scenarios. Social movements, underpinned by ideology, create 
partisan, transnational echo chambers, and communities, which are in 
the process of ‘changing the weather’ in contemporary social 
interactions. Transnational advocacy networks work in tandem to 
‘create the message’ and perpetuate narratives. Where extremist 
dialogue crosses over into violence, we argue that a new form of 
conflict emerges. Such conflict does not have the preservation of the 
state as a territorially important factor or reference point, but rather, the 
preservation and promotion of a cultural identity. Where ‘other’ 
identities also co-exist, as in multicultural societies, these extremist 
views, and the crossover to violence from extremist rhetoric, arguably 
create a new type of warfare which we label fifth generation. 
Fifth generation warfare (5GW) is a complex idea. It is at best ill- 
defined and mis-understood. It is often confused or conflated with 
evolving methods of warfare (Alderman 2015; Layton, 2017; Reed, 
2008). It has also been used to describe what waging future war may 
look like. It has been envisioned variously as networked, within a 
combat cloud, fusion based and multi-domain in nature (Layton, 2017). 
It has also been described as non-contact warfare (Alderman, 2015). 
Reed (2008) refers to 5GW as states fighting enemies without always 
knowing who the enemies are and crafting strategies to exploit 
weaknesses of enemies using asymmetrical methods against the state 
(Reed, 2008: 685). It could be argued that the first two 
conceptualisations, referred to above, do not denote a significant 
change in warfare but rather, the continuation of the development of 
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weapons, ways, and means, with which to fight conventional and 
unconventional third generation wars. Third generation wars might be 
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described as those which utilise technology and kinetic means to 
dominate other states or state enemies. 
The third conceptualisation (Reed, 2008) might be described as 
referring to fourth generation warfare - which is state based in nature - 
as it seeks to address threats which might be defined as insurgent. By 
insurgency we mean non-state actors which may or may not be 
transnational and who seek to remove, overthrow or destabilise state 
governments for political, religious or ideological reasons. This paper 
argues that an understanding of fifth generation warfare takes as its 
base the focusing of attention not on the tactics of war but on the 
combatant. 
In this sense fifth generation warfare is not a continuation of the ways 
and means of waging wars against states but rather a new type of 
warfare which exists within the state but not necessarily waged against 
the state. Instead, groups fight other groups in a competition for 
cultural dominance and values-based legitimacy and authority. Fifth 
generation conflict does not have economic motivation as a primary 
incentive but economic disenfranchisement, as a result of the 
institutionalised cultural dominance of one group over another, might 
be a significant driver. However, 5G warfare instead might be viewed 
as struggles for dominance within the state, conducted by groups 
competing amongst themselves. 
In figures 1, 2, and 3 below, the differences between the first three 
generations of state-based warfare, insurgency (fourth generation) and 
fifth generation warfare are summarized. Distinctions are drawn 
between (A) the rationale for engaging in warfare, (B) the combatants, 
(C) the nature of the weapons used, and (D) the key objectives, or 
purpose of the violence. 
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Figure 1: State Based Conventional Warfare 1st, 2nd and 3rd Generations 
 
Figure 2: State based Unconventional Conflict (Insurgency): 4th Generation 
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Figure 3: Contemporary Conflict: 5th Generation 
DEFINITION 
Fifth generation warfare is conflict which has moved beyond the 
territorial boundaries of states and into the realm of non-territorially 
bound, non-political causes but more importantly, it focuses on self- 
identification created by the individual and shaped by an idea. 5G 
fighters might then be better understood as social actors, united by a 
set of core beliefs which become more than just political or religious 
tenets but which shape both the identity of the individual and the nature 
of the collective they are a part of. The preservation of this identity 
becomes the basis of which movements are formed and violence 
engaged in. 5G warfare is therefore not defined by the state. It might 
be described as post-state (Bennett, 1998). This post-state nature 
distinguishes 5G warfare by the fact that it is conflict conducted both 
within and without the state and not against or for the state. 
By ‘post-state’ we mean that violent 5G actors are less like terrorists 
seeking territorially or state bound political objectives and more like 
violent social movements which may or may not transcend the 
boundaries of the state. 5G actors may utilize terrorist means to achieve 
recognition and survival of a socially and culturally defined way of life. 
5G actors might be best described as “trans-dimensional, 
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transnational actors” (Hoffman 2007:78). It might be argued that 5G 
conflict is less political issue driven and more a question of ‘belonging’ 
driven in terms of the motivators which inspire the actions of 5G actors 
who join violent or other transnational social movements which have 
at their core cultural underpinnings. A violent transnational social 
movement might be defined as transcending the boundaries of single 
states, united many subjective perspectives into one social and social 
media driven movement, in order to address culturally specific issues. 
There may be a multiplicity of perspectives on the issue but a 
homogenous conceptualisation that some aspect of social or cultural 
importance is under an existential threat. 
Identity as the Basis of Conflict 
Cerise (2015, 2018) applies polemology (the study of war) as a means 
of understanding factors which lead to war and by extension the means 
by which identity might be viewed as a conflict factor (2018:1). The 
possibility that polemic or extremist values might be amplified to such 
a degree as to enable social conflict which is sufficiently divisive, that 
the promotion of one group’s values become so urgent, that violent 
expressions might ensue, is an important point in 5G warfare. Such 
differences might be manipulated to impact the cohesiveness of plural 
or multi-cultural democratic states. Polemic rivalries in this regard 
might then be considered mimetic rivalries (Girard, as cited by Cerise, 
2018:1). Such rivalries arise when individuals willingly form bonds 
with each other on the basis of a voluntary ‘affirmation of superiority’ 
over other groups. (Grasset, 1978:406). These mimetic rivalries, one 
could argue, might lead to a situation that could be described as a 
cultural ‘security dilemma’ between different groups within society. 
This binary approach implicitly communicates the options available 
for other social groups in the community - dominate or be dominated, 
survive or be subjugated in a cultural reality which impinges upon 
values, behaviours and beliefs. In turn, other groups assert their 
mirrored affirmations in a socio-cultural security dilemma of 
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escalating tensions between groups within the state. This can also apply 
to trans-national groups who self-identify with the values, behaviours 
and beliefs of social movements which are designed to escalate or 
amplify, the importance of affirmation and thus inclusion, in a 
movement which is bigger and more meaningful than an individual 
solitary life, on the fringes of society or acceptance. Inclusion in groups 
which proclaim cultural superiority offers the sensation of strength and 
unity in numbers for the disenfranchised, the outsider and the loner. 
Ethno-Cultural Securitisation and Violent Social Movements 
Given the motivation for conflict outlined above, culture might be 
seen as the catalyst which incites the conglomeration of like-minded 
individuals into polycentric, reticulate and segmentary social 
movements as a means of the preservation, protection and promotion 
of an existentially threatened identity as perceived by the members of 
that community. Cultural ‘securitisation’ might therefore be 
considered the root of contemporary social conflict. We might argue 
that identitarianism has arisen as a mimetic and polemic response to 
the high-profile nature of ISIS inspired and Jihadist movements. 
Further we might define ISIS inspired and Jihadist actors as violent 
transnational social movements (VTSM). An additional consideration 
would be understanding that members of VTSMs arguably display 
behaviour which might be considered as a distinct ethnicity. We might, 
in this case, define ethnicity as belonging to a social group that has a 
common cultural traditional, or beliefs and practices, and which may or 
may not have common ancestry. In this sense we might consider that 
VTSMs take on the characteristics of civic nations. We might describe 
civic nations as those bound only by a belief in shared common bonds 
(Horowitz, 1985). “The civic nation is consequently "open," inclusive: 
one can become a member by free-choice” (Zubrzycki, 2002:278). We 
might also consider ethnicity as a social construct which the members 
of a group agree to be bound within, by adopting, perpetuating and 
maintaining the common characteristics which set the group apart from 
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other groups (Camoroff, 2009). Civic nations are merely groups who 
have a subjective belief in their common descent which could be based 
on either, or both physical similarity or perpetuation of similar customs. 
The mutual acknowledgment of a shared bond and shared belief is 
important for group formation or identity. It does not matter whether an 
objective blood relationship exists in order for a civic nation to be 
formed. Taking the above into account, an argument can be made that 
5G conflict might be viewed as ethno-cultural in nature and based on 
culturally distinct nations competing for dominance within the state. 
Where the prevailing dominant culture is challenged violently by other 
cultural warriors (5G actors) is it possible that we incorrectly define it 
as terrorist? Are the definitions applied to terrorism apt? It could be 
argued that such actions might instead be considered identity-based 
conflict. What we define as terrorist might possibly be the development 
of a new form of warfare with new combatants fighting for non- 
political objectives which involve the preservation of, or reaction to, 
an existential threat to a set core of culturally sensitive beliefs and 
patterns of behaviour. 
5th Generation Warfare 
5G warfare might therefore be defined as group against group, not 
against the state necessarily. It could be argued that it has been enabled 
by shifts of political and social loyalties to ‘causes’ and polemic 
identities; and away from the dominance of state legitimacy and 
authority. 5G groups are comprised of like-minded people, with no 
formal organization who may be loosely related or not related at all but 
who choose to adopt violence in the pursuit of the preservation or 
promotion of an identity or way of life (Minhas, 2016). The shift in the 
nature of the combatants and ‘objectives of war’ in the fifth generation 
of warfare is a return to group, tribe, ethnic, family or gang based 
functional and protective units, which resemble most pre- Westphalian 
conflict groups. There is one significant difference 
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between these pre-Westphalian group conflicts and 5G war - In the past 
groups fought against groups and not against the state as a territorially 
sovereign entity. The state did not exist. Instead, city states and feudal 
land-based conflict was territorially oriented and religious wars were 
for the benefit of winning territory, to expand or curtail the reach of 
religions but was still territorially focused. Economic as well as 
territorial benefits were the key drivers of pre-Westphalian conflict. 
Contemporary social conflict (5G warfare) is not concerned with the 
central issue of territory or, arguably economic benefits. We might 
argue an example of which was the increased danger and uncertainty 
of ISIS inspired actors increased as its territorial reach reduced. Al 
Qaeda objectives did not and do not include territorial gain or economic 
benefits in order to exist, or as the reason for existence. 
5G conflict might be described as “post state” in that for the first time 
since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, war does not necessarily 
involve a state actor, i.e. state against another state, as displayed by 1st, 
2nd and 3rd generations of war, or against the state itself in an insurgency 
action such as 4th generation war (Lind, 2004). The fifth generation of 
warfare instead is focused on other groups within the state, in a struggle 
for dominance within the state or across the borders of states. It might 
also be viewed as a continuation of the crisis of legitimacy which 
catalyses 4th generation insurgencies (Lind & Thiele, 2015:6). 
Can we apply the term ‘warfare’ to contemporary social conflict? 
5G warfare is best understood in the context of conflict. Conflict, as 
defined by Folger, Poole, and Stutman (1997) is the interaction of 
interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and 
interference from each other in achieving those goals. It might also be 
perceived as a divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current 
aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). 
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The application of the term warfare to 5G conflict might be considered 
problematic if established laws of war and definitions are used to 
interpret the actions of 5G actors. Alternative perspectives are required 
to understand the distinctions which emerge in the security problem 
presented by 5G actors. It might be argued that Clausewitz's trinitarian 
model (people, army and government) does not account for low 
intensity conflict and in particular asymmetric, hybrid and 
unconventional warfare (French, 1992). This may be largely due to the 
fact that Clauswitz implies that war must be pursued in the context of 
state dominance. War might be seen in this case as a political act in 
pursuance of state policy directives. Clauswitz’s perspective that war 
is a continuation of politics or policy implies statehood as an 
imperative (Clauswitz, 1997:22). From this perspective it would seem 
that legally and historically war is an act which can only be fought by 
states. If this is so then intra group conflict might not be referred to as 
warfare. 
Van Creveld, however, indicates that intra state wars are possible, as 
distinct from Civil War. Intra-state wars seek to create separate states 
- and governance - within a state, unlike civil war which is fought to 
assume control of the state (Van Creveld, 2017:173). This implies the 
possibility that war can be fought by an entity which is not itself a state. 
French (1992) suggests that ‘through history, the role of states could 
be taken up by various leagues, associations, city-states, religious 
orders, and other entities, which throughout history, can and have 
conducted war” (French, 1992:3). 
War can be an end in itself rather than a means to an end (Van Creveld, 
2017). In this context, cultural dominance conflict, may not necessarily 
have an end, except for addressing the existential threat to a culture or 
a perceived distinct civic nation. Throughout history war has also 
included “struggles for national or ethnic existence which became 
much more than mere means to an end” (French, 1992:4). 
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Viewed in this light, the term warfare might be considered valid as 
applied to 5th generation actors. The distinction between these conflicts 
of the past in the pre-Westphalian period (the period before ‘states’) is 
that 5G warfare is fought not with armies, and thus not part of the 
Clauswitz trinitarian model but by groups against groups who are 
civilians and not professional fighters, as in an intra state war. Van 
Creveld does not entirely agree that this can be termed warfare, but 
Lebow (2008) does. Lebow sees culture as a legitimate basis upon 
which war can be fought. Culture, defined as “relationships among 
individuals, groups, ideas and identities” has been a basis for fighting 
war (Lebow, 2008:269). Warfare might therefore be seen as the friction 
and attendant violence which accompanies the struggle for the 
preservation, maintenance or creation of cultural ways of life under an 
existentialist threat. We might therefore view 5G warfare as non- 
trinitarian warfare - a term coined by Van Creveld (1992:49), since he 
explains that war is not necessarily fought between two states. (Van 
Creveld, 1992:41) “War may be conducted by entities other than states 
and by means other than armies” (French, 1992). Referring to Van 
Creveld’s non-trinitarian theory of warfare. “For a thousand years after 
the fall of Rome armed conflict was waged by different kinds of social 
entities” (French, 1992). The distinction here is that these, while being 
motivated by territorial, geographic, or economic concerns, were 
nevertheless engaged in warfare. Thus, we can apply the term warfare 
to 5G cultural fighters with the distinction that the cultural imperative 
distinguishes pre-Westphalian groups from contemporary 5G fighters 
and the lack of state or geopolitical focus which was the primary driver 
of the previous 4 generations of fighters. 
5G warfare also need not be kinetic but can be fought in informational 
domains. In the current context 5G warfare might be seen to be 
conducted more or less in the domain of non-professional fighters. 
While contemporary terrorist attackers are often scrutinised for links 
to military training or engagement in battlefields in far off lands the 
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reality is that this is increasingly not the case. There are only three 
recent European examples of attackers who may have had military 
training or experience. The Manchester concert bomber Salman Abedi 
(reportedly had relationships with Libyan ISIS), Anis Amri (the Berlin 
Christmas market attacker who had joined a group led by Abu Walaa 
an alleged ISIS recruiter), and Najim Laachraoui (the Paris and 
Brussels attack bombmaker who allegedly had relationships with 
Syrian ISIS operatives). Other contemporary ‘terrorist attacks have not 
demonstrated military training or professional military contact or 
relationships beyond ‘inspiration’. More troubling is the inclusion of 
alt-right extremists such as Incel alt-right attackers Elliot Ledger, Alek 
Minassian or David (Ali) Sonboly, an Iranian and reportedly a white 
supremacist famous for shouting “I am a German” during an attack in 
Munich 2016, and Norwegian Anders Breivik also a white 
supremacist. The 2017 New Mexico school shooter William Atchison 
reportedly was a frequent contributor to Alt-Right forums including 
“The Daily Stormer” and 4chan and was allegedly a member of an anti- 
refugee online club called Steam which also featured Ali Sonboly. 
Parkland shooter Nikolas Cruz also had a disturbing online presence 
espousing alt-right views (MacLaughlin & Park, 2018). These men did 
not have military training or professional military relationships. They 
espoused and violently acted on extremist cultural social ‘movements.’ 
5G fighters can conduct warfare with unprecedented reach and 
sophisticated poise. 
The Lind Grid, (see below) is a checklist for those operating in 4th 
generation warfare theatres. Lind and Thiele (2015) conceptualised the 
grid as a means of determining the moral impact of kinetic operations 
against insurgencies as this was deemed important in winning hearts 
and minds- a key factor in counter insurgency operations (COIN). It  is 
designed to help commanders gauge the outcomes of kinetic actions 
against insurgent communities. It can also be applied to military 
operations other than war. The Lind grid (figure 4) helps tactical 
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decisionmakers to determine the moral and mental wins for any given 
tactical operation. 
We adapt the Lind Grid (see figure 5) to consider the cultural and social 
impacts which will allow tactical and operational decisionmakers to 
factor in the impact on social movements, and identity-based extremist 
groups within populations. When an action is undertaken by the state 
against a 5G group, there are two indicators which might be used to 
judge the impact. This grid identifies those indicators so that any 
kinetic or other action undertaken by the state can be assessed in 
advance. The grid in Figure 5 is designed so that operational and 
tactical decisionmakers can predict the possible outcomes of state- 
based activities against 5G groups, where the state determines that the 
actions of these 5G groups present a threat to state legitimacy and 
sovereignty. Tactical or kinetic actions can be judged based on whether 
they increase or decrease tribal bonds or increase or decrease identity 
affirmation. 
Tribal bonds might be defined as the cultural narrative which unifies 
and strengthens group relationships. Identity affirmation might be 
defined as things that contribute to the development of positive (and 
strong feelings) and a sense of belonging (Ghavami, Fingerhut, Peplau, 
Grant, Wittig, 2011). Where tribal bonds are increased, actions are not 
advisable. Tribal bonds are the glue that bind social movements 
together via the perception of a threat to their particular group. 
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Figure 4: The Lind Grid (Lind & Theile, 2015) is a checklist for those operating in 
theatre, to help gauge the outcomes of actions 
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Figure 5: 5G Impact Indicator (Cultural Matrix) An adaptation from Lind & Thiele 
2015. The 5G impact indicator matrix addresses two additional considerations for 
kinetic and other state-based activities in 5G warfare theatre. The matrix helps to 
assess and weigh the actions of state-based operations on 5G actors using two key 
indicators of impact: tribal bonds and identity affirmation. 
Conclusion 
Fifth generation warfare suggests an evolution whereby it is not the 
professional soldier which wages war but the citizen. To refine the idea 
further it occurs at the point of friction where groups of citizens compete 
for legitimacy with the state but not from or for the state and amongst 
themselves. This war is engendered by the narrative of social 
movements which may be expressed in mob or pack circumstances. The 
term violent transnational social movements comes to mind. When 
applied to instances of contemporary conflict, this paper suggests that 
the term terrorism might be a misnomer. Terrorists fight for a political 
concept - politics being the struggle for influence of the interests of a 
section of a population being impacted by actions of the state or by state 
policy. A terrorist is therefore using violence to create fear in the pursuit 
of a political objective. A specific objective relating to the way the 
interests of this section of the population is either being ignored or not 
acted upon by the state. Insurgency is most easily described as the 
actions of a group either armed or unarmed specifically intending to 
overthrow the governing apparatus of a state. Both these definitions 
refer to the state as the entity the ‘enemy’ is fighting against. It also helps 
to highlight the reluctance of Westphalian state governments to define 
native/domestic violent actors as ideational terrorists (the implication of 
the state’s inability to address the specific needs of sections of the 
population). 5G warfare might be considered a ‘vortex of violence 
(Beebe, 2010), where the boundaries between ‘battle space’ and civil 
society, as comprised of social movements and cultural causes as well 
as identity driven collectives begin to blur as a result of frustration. In 
this blurring, is the space where future war will be fought. 
“The first duty of any social entity is to protect the lives of its members. 
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Either modern states cope with low intensity conflict or else they will 
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disappear” (Van Creveld, 1991: 224). We argue that this disappearance 
takes the shape of the increasing relevance of, and allegiance to, groups 
and causes versus towards the state. 5G warfare might thus be 
considered identity-based war in an attempt to dominate the opposing 
culture or “other” culture. The transnational nature of such warfare and 
its combatants distinguishes previous state-based generations of war 
from 5G warfare. Violent transnational social movements based on 
identity, thus play a significant role in contemporary conflict and 
arguably change the shape and nature of contemporary warfare by 
introducing a new generation of war which does not use the state or 
territory as a reference point. 
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